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Extended security concept 8 Tables   Table 1: Contributions of development policy to stabilizing countries affected by crisis and conflict 13 In December 2003 the European Union formulated a common security policy based on a draft presented by the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana. Despite a number of setbacks experienced in the process of developing a common foreign and security policy, viewed in conceptual terms, the strategy finally adopted should be interpreted as a qualitative advance. While the CFSP continues to be one of the EU's intergovernmental pillars with marked coherence problems, the European Security Strategy (ESS), which identifies security threats as well as strategic responses to those threats, is an important contribution to a more coherent and thus more effective implementation of European foreign, security, and development policy. 1 Against the background of this recent development, this paper will discuss the emerging integration of European foreign, security, and development policy. The paper proceeds in three steps: The following section will start out with a brief summary of the ESS' key arguments and hereafter place some of the security strategy paper's most important propositions in the overall context of the future articulation of Europe's external relations. In a second step we will analyze, from the perspective of development policy, the challenges that will emerge in connection with a closer dovetailing of security and development policy. This section on the one hand outlines arguments in favor of a more proactive involvement of development policy in European security policy. On the other hand, we also highlight the need for development policy to craft strategically oriented concepts from its large operational experiences, if it is to play a more strategic role in European security policy. Building on these arguments, we will then, in a third step, tackle the organizational challenges for development cooperation (DC), which have resulted from its increasing involvement in security issues. In this context, we present a strategic diagram containing some possible scenarios facing a future European development policy in the context of the new framework of Europe´s external relations. 2 
Content and Characteristics of the European Security Strategy
The ESS defines three principal security threats for the European Union (EU). 2 First, an extremely violence-prone, transnationally networked terrorism that is for the most part motivated by religious fundamentalism has set its sights on Europe and is seeking to expand its base of operations. Second, the security threat caused by the (potential) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that could lead both to new arms races in regions of strategic relevance to Europe and to a combination of WMD proliferation and terrorism. Third, the threat stemming from the failure and erosion of state systems in many of the world's regions because state erosion provides the space for organized international crime such as trafficking in humans, drugs, and arms as well as for organizing terrorist activities. The ESS concludes that all of those security threats facing Europe are of an increasingly global nature, a fact, which has induced the EU to define the field of its own security interests in global terms. As a consequence, the EU has no choice but to assume the role of a global security actor and to gear its worldwide strategic responses to these threats. Against the background of this scenario, the ESS derives some essential strategic thrusts of a global European security policy.
First, it is noted, that the EU needs to expand the security belt around Europe, since the process of globalization and the ongoing EU enlargement is diminishing the geographic distance between the EU and the most sensitive areas for European security such as the Near and Middle East and the Caucasus region. Particular importance is given to the need for extensive cooperation with the EU's new member states and their neighbors in eastern and southeastern Europe. Furthermore, importance is given to the need for en-gaging more intensively with Mediterranean states and for providing cooperative contributions for solving the Israeli-Arab conflict.
Second, in view of the new transnational security threats, the EU will have to step up its efforts to help forge an effective multilateral world order. According to the ESS, only by strengthening both international organizations and a global security regime compatible with the norms of the UN Charter, can the international community create an international framework capable of mitigating the risks outlined above.
Third, the EU needs to further develop its capacities to take enhanced action against transnational terrorism, international crime and the proliferation of WMD. Furthermore, the EU needs to augment its attempts to prevent state failure respectively to reduce the scope of ensuing crises. In this context, the EU needs to orient its military capacities to the described threats. However, the ESS makes clear, that these security threats of the 21 st century cannot be addressed by purely military means. The EU must have at its disposal a mix of instruments consisting of civil and military measures.
The ESS' Characteristics
By placing the ESS in the overall context of Europe's external relations, its limitation to security policy is obvious. The concept is marked by a concentration of EU external relations to the goal system of security. It therefore covers only one, albeit a central, dimension of Europe's external relations, while largely turning a blind eye to other important challenges such as the management of world economic interdependencies or technological-scientific cooperation aimed at strengthening the EU's competitiveness. Thus, instead of being a project designed to shape the EU's multifarious external relations, or a thematically broadened EU foreign policy enabling the Union to play a greater hand in shaping global governance, the strategy concept is largely restricted to security policy. At the same time, the security strategy is not oriented to a traditional security concept defined by a system of strictly territorial states with differentiating military potentials. Rather, the strategy is based on a concept of "extended security". Viewed from this perspective, insecurity and escalating violence may be rooted in complex economic, power-related, sociocultural, and/or environmental factors. Javier Solana, for example has noted: "Many Regions -especially Africa -are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity, and poverty. Regional conflicts fuel the demand for proliferation. Violent religious extremism is linked to the pressure of modernization, and to the alienation of young people in societies, which are experiencing social, cultural and political crisis". 3 Accordingly, sustainable security policy is not only a matter of military capacities but is based on the ability to use, at the earliest possible point, a combination of civil and military instruments to defuse both political and socioeconomic crises before they turn violent. This combination thus implies the use of a broad range of development-, foreign-, economic-, and environmental-policy instruments and the classic security-policy set consisting of police cooperation, intelligence cooperation, and, in the extreme case, military intervention. Consequently, the ESS calls for a closer dovetailing of various instruments from the different fields of EU's external relations as well as for efforts to gear them to the goals of security policy.
Beyond the vision of "extended security", the ESS has a European "bias", when compared to the US National Security Strategy of September 2002. While there are important areas in which both, the ESS and the US Security Strategy overlap, both concepts arrive (in part) at different conclusions. The specifically European profile is manifest in three aspects: first, in the emphasis with which the European security strategy calls for efforts to strengthen a multilateral world order and international law; second, in the emphasis placed on conflict prevention and civil cooperation, i.e. in a long-term perspective keyed to preventing state failure; finally, in efforts to embed political pressure and the use of robust military intervention in the framework of the international legal order.
From this perspective, as far as the Transatlantic relationship is concerned, the European profile could facilitate a division of labor with the US on security policy. Scarce material resources available to restructure European military potentials as well as enormous differences as regards the direction and the pace of the European integration process in the military sector, a Transatlantic division of labor could possible be emerging: with its relatively modest military capacities, the EU, acting in the capacity of a cooperative world power, could seek to focus its efforts in the fields of prevention, conflict resolution, and stabilization of fragile states. In matters bound up with the military dimensions of security policy -going beyond highly limited missions like the present one in Montenegro -the EU would remain the US' "junior partner". As such, the US as the only military power with a global intervention radius, is practically predestined in the medium term to conduct robust military missions. However, the apparent inability of US foreign and security policy to win the peace in Iraq and to contribute effectively to Iraq's political and socioeconomic development, could lead the US to develop a more marked willingness to accept the EU's "softpower capacities and experiences". Such a scenario implies that the EU -possibly in cooperation with the United States -should undertake concerted efforts to further develop the multilateral legal framework with respect to "humanitarian intervention" and deployment of military forces to protect international security. At the same time, while increasing responsiveness to the altered security threats in an era of transnational terrorism, organized crime and failing states, the EU should simultaneously embed such endeavors in the multilateral institutions set out for example in the UN Charter and the UN Security Council's "monopoly on power". As such, military interventions may well be necessary to contain violence, but they must be clearly based on international rules, principles, procedures, and legal institutions. An "eye-level" transatlantic partnership with the US, which would have to be developed on the basis of a European security concept, would have prospects of success only if the EU were to actually and comprehensively assume its responsibility in conflict resolution as well as in efforts to strengthen weak states and considerably enlarge its engagement in this area. Development policy would have to play an important role in this context. Otherwise, as Robert Cooper -Director of the EU's Directorate "General External Economic Relations and Common Foreign In such contexts, development policy can achieve its effects only if its efforts are flanked by measures designed to increase these countries' political stability and security. Without peaceful coexistence in societies embedded in a framework of liberal state structures, the probable scenario for these countries is very likely to be one of either despotism or civil war, both being clearly unconducive to socioeconomic development.
Yet the relationship between development and security may just as well be viewed the other way around.
In the long run international security is not to be had without development. In a growingly borderless world, fragile states and crumbling societies are bound to pose transnational security threats: like those in Afghanistan, Sudan, Congo, Somalia, or Colombia, with their socioeconomic development blocked by the given political conditions. From such a perspective, impoverishment processes, ecological degradation, moribund education systems together with weak state institutions, corruption, and political exclusion generate the well-known and explosive socio-economic mixture consisting of organized crime, religious and/or ethnic extremism, widespread hopelessness and political violence. In the extreme case, these developments result in serious state erosion and civil war, conditions, which are the seedbeds of transnational terrorism, international organized crime, and WMD proliferation.
These interdependencies between security and development are the reason why it is imperative to forge a new alliance between development policy and security policy in such existing or potential "zones of disorder". For traditional security policy and development policy, the growing interfaces of both policy arenas have strategic consequences that are at least partially reflected in the ESS. First, there are moral reasons for according more attention to the nexus of security and development in the process of shaping Europe's foreign relations. A critical public sphere to heed these moral "obligations" is furthermore calling on politics: i.e. public opinion in Europe is also exerting pressure for a closer intertwinement of security policy with development policy. Second, an enlightened self-interest calls for a coupling of security policy and development policy. If globalization is increasingly affecting barriers to development in geographically distant parts of the world, then the obvious response -or indeed necessity, when Europe's immediate "neighborhood" is concerned -would be to more closely interlink development policy with security policy. If Europe's aim is in fact a world order defined by international law and underpinned by security policy, what we need is a development policy that encourages partner-country's acceptance of liberal standards of national and international "good" governance.
Taking the close interrelationship between security policy and development policy seriously and recognizing the crucial influence of participatory and accountable governance on economic and international cooperation, this would be to raise the promotion of democratic regimes to the level of a guideline not only from a development but also from a security perspective. Thus, the EU's security policy has to assume the stance of an explicit promoter of liberal state structures if it is in fact to tackle the root causes of the current security threats. This would mean adjusting Europe's security policy to an existing, central thrust of development policy. Yet, these conclusions, which are consonant with the logic of the ESS, have not yet reached the mainstream of foreign policy makers and researchers as is demonstrated by continuous calls for a classic stability policy that acquiesces in authoritarian rule as a response to political turmoil and civil war.
Against the background of the trends outlined above, how is development policy to position itself vis-à-vis an ESS that is gradually winning contours of its own? Despite the increasing links between development and security policy, one can observe a high degree of uncertainty in the (European) developmentcooperation community. On the one hand, DC actors cannot close their eyes to the increasing overlap between development policy and security policy. But on the other hand these overlaps are bound up with three latent and closely interrelated fears in large parts of the DC community:
1) The first consists in the fear that resources within the DC portfolio could be extensively reallocated in favor of investments of particular relevance to security policy. A close dovetailing of development policy and security policy could, from this perspective, lead to a re-channelling of funds from developing countries or regions with less relevance to security policy to "risk countries", or from "classic" fields of development policy (e.g. basic education, resource protection) to sectors more relevant to security policy (e.g. support for police and military).
2) The second fear is that the security imperative anchored in Europe's foreign relations might alter the goal system of development policy and therefore undermines other central issue areas of development cooperation. While development cooperation is in fact in a position to provide contributions to international security policy by helping to stabilize fragile societies, as well as by promoting democracy and good governance, it does have other, "autonomous" goals of its own. These goals like those of the Rio-Agenda and the Millennium Development Goals cannot be reduced to immediate "contributions" to security policy. Thus, the ESS might easily awaken the impression that development policy could be "incorporated" within the EU's complex security conception.
3) The third fear is bound up with the concern that Europe's foreign and security policy could coopt development policy. The latter, it is feared, could gradually lose its autonomy as a policy field and be instrumentalized by foreign and security policy, without gaining in return any possibilities to take a hand in shaping the course of world events. Development policy could become the handmaiden of foreign and security policy, and be nudged out of any involvement in decisions taken at the interfaces between development cooperation and security policy.
These fears that funds may be (re-) allocated at the expense of "traditional issues" of development policy; that the goal coordinates of development policy are to be altered, and that development policy may be coopted by a future European security policy are not unjustified. Some observers have in this connection rightly pointed to the years of the Cold War, when development policy was all too often forced to take the back seat to the interests of security policy. At the same time, it is obvious that a strategy of seeking to evade the interdependencies between foreign, security, and development policy , and instead falling, as it were, passively back on old, "traditional" fields, is rather unlikely to meet with success. Instead, development policy is more likely to lose a measure of its significance if it declines to become involved in these strategy debates. In view of the -in our opinion -largely pertinent risk analysis provided by the ESS, development policy should adopt a proactive strategy that self-assuredly includes the comparative strengths of DC.
The ESS' Blindspots and the Obligations of Development Cooperation
Any proactive positioning of development cooperation that places more emphasis on the opportunities than the risks is not only legitimized -vis-à-vis other policy fields -by development policy's own interests. Rather, development policy derives its legitimacy from the fact of being the policy field in possession of the greatest trove of experience in conflict prevention, stabilization of weak societies, and civil activities in post-conflict situations. In view of its operational capacities, development policy can therefore be said to be relatively well equipped to help resolve complex security problems, consisting of trans-national interdependencies, privatized violence, and unstable state structures. This strength could compensate for the limits and weaknesses of traditional foreign and security policy. In this context, even the innovative ESS with its orientation to the concept of "extended security", displays two blind spots typical of classic foreign and security policy: 1) First, the ESS security strategy, like most other originally foreign-policy contributions to the "new security policy", beyond broad strategic thrusts offers little on how to deal with the complexity of the links between socioeconomic development on the one hand and government instability, terrorism, and organized crime on the other. Foreign policy generally has even less to offer when it comes to concrete knowledge concerning the best operational approaches to preventing state erosion and state failure and supporting the development of viable and more or less liberal government structures. The process character that is typically at work in development cooperation programs, for instance when supporting poverty reduction, the provision of basic social services, and "good" governance is for the most part given insufficient attention in other policy fields. Consequently the latter often do not have the long-term perspective needed to eliminate the breeding grounds for terrorism, organized and the proliferation of WMD. However, it is precisely this process character that one has to focus on if the new security threats are to be combated effectively. Development policy in this field of activity can fall back on decades of operational experience, is typified by a high level of realism concerning the pitfalls involved, and is mindful of the time dimension required for cooperation with weak states.
2) The second blind spot of the ESS consists of a failure to reflect adequately on the interests of potential partners outside the OECD. The ESS is, in essence, Eurocentric. Apart from the threats posed by failing states, transnational terror, and proliferation of WMD, it is also essential to more clearly perceive concerns about the basic foundations of "human security" in the developing world, if the proclaimed intention to promote the development of a global security architecture is in fact to be taken seriously. Most of the violence experienced in the world since the 1990s was due not to the transnational terrorism that rudely awakened the OECD countries from their dream of a peaceful "end of history". Instead, what has been causing most human disaster have been the proceedings in Chechnya, Palestine, Rwanda, Congo, Sudan, Colombia and other zones of permanent violence. Only after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, have these zones received substantial attention, however primarily because of their implicit security threat for Europe and not so much because of the implicit political and economic causes of these violent conflicts. Again in the ESS, these causes find little attention and therefore, the endogenous interests of developing countries as the natural partners for combating the new security threats, have been systematically ignored. If that, the ESS would have paid more, and more serious, attention to the Millennium Goals, the Doha Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg Process. Should attempts fail to achieve effective progress toward a "fair globalization", the outcome is likely to be problems in the security cooperation between Europe and potential partners in the non-OECD world and instabilities in the global system. Perceiving global risks only in terms of factors which immediately affect the security of the OECD and being indifferent towards the problem complexes threatening the human, political, and economic security of poorer regions is problematic in conceptual terms; for it is in the zones of disorder that the root socioeconomic causes of the new security risks are bred.
European development policy is thus going to have to make up for some lost ground. Using its rich stock of experience in precisely those fields where "classic" foreign policy has relatively little to say, development policy must profile itself as a strategic partner. Yet development policy itself is still far from being in a position to offer any magic formulas to counter state failure and the spiraling of developing countries into civil war and social disintegration. Development policy sees itself faced with the challenge of marshaling its conceptual and operational knowledge in the field, translating it into manageable, countryspecific strategies, and explaining to outside actors the viability and effectiveness of its own set of instruments. What is needed most of all is a strategy along the lines of the Solana model for the 25-30 fragile states in the world. Which of them are of priority for European development policy? What systematic lessons can be learnt from the experience in the Balkans, East Timor or even Central America? Are established monitoring processes adequate for the surveillance of crisis countries? How should the EU member states' approaches to crisis prevention be coordinated? What will an effective strategy for stabilising weak states cost? To cope with these challenges effectively, development policy can build on three comparative strengths:
1) Since the 1990s, development policy has been involved intensively with the various facets of promoting "good" governance, the ultimate key to eliminating the causes of new security threats. The ESS' stated goal of eliminating the long-term threats posed by weak states can be achieved only by strengthening liberal government structures in the respective countries. For gains in stability made by arbitrary, despotic rule seldom have a future, and all too often they tend to increase social polarization, block development, give rise to political resistance, and thus to new security risks in the medium term. No other policy field has looked so intensively into the potentials and the limitations involved in efforts to promote good governance and nation-building based on liberal principles.
2) Good background knowledge of socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, and politico-economic interdependencies as well as operational experience in the relevant countries is absolutely essential to providing both development-oriented and security-relevant support in the cases of failing states or crises prevention. Beyond their experience in the field of good governance, development-policy actors are equipped with this comparative advantage of country-specific expertise. This expertise is needed to link humanitarian aid, efforts to (re)build government structures, poverty reduction, and economic development strategies in such a way as to provide solid contributions to a sustainable security policy.
3) Finally, development-policy actors are the "natural-born" brokers to mediate between the interests of the EU and developing countries. This implies that development-policy actors are in a position both to represent European security interests and to assume the role of the actors of Europe's external relations that are most familiar with the legitimate interests of the developing countries and best able to factor these interests into their activities.
These described comparative advantages result in a number of criteria that may provide an initial strategic mapping for security-relevant development cooperation (table) . These criteria will have to be supplemented with operational and country-specific and therefore, context-dependent measures. If development policy succeeds in formulating, from this rich trove of know-how, a properly defined set of best practices designed to deal effectively with the relevant security-related issues, it will be able to position itself as a strategically relevant actor in the context of the Solana strategy. A proactive orientation of this kind is not only likely to prove to be the best way to avoid any cooptation of foreign and security policy. It is at the same time apt to be the key condition needed by development policy to make clear that it is responsible too for other significant and resource-intensive issues (like sustainable development, poverty reduction) which go beyond the agenda of security relevant development policies. Or to put it differently: if development policy fails to assert its interests proactively in the ongoing process, it may well find itself up against a set of instruments and modes of resource allocation that are dictated by other actors.
One of the most challenging problems, that European DC has to tackle effectively, when attempting to reach the above mentioned goal, are the institutional blockades to policy coherency. Furthermore, an effective security policy containing a strong preventive component is very costly, long-term in nature, intensive in terms of coordination, and unlikely always to be crowned with success. In a contribution to European security policy, development policy is thus called upon to point unmistakably to these factors as well. For example, the proposal drafted in September 2004 by the Barcelona Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities points at the heart of the debate. It recommends that a "Human Security Response Force" (comprising around 5,000 civilians) should be created in addition to the planned EU military force. This would need to be a force of highly trained, rapidly deployable specialists (development and humanitarian aid experts, administrators, human rights monitors, police). It should not have to struggle with internal language barriers. Its members should undergo regular training together so that a sense of "corporate identity" is formed and operational routines become standard. Such a civilian EU intervention force needs to learn to cooperate with other foreign and security policy actors including the military to prepare for the challenge of coordinating foreign, security and development action in the case of crisis. By creating such a force, the EU would acquire the human resource capacity needed to translate the concept of "extended security" into action.
In view of the bottleneck and risk factors involved, European development policy is therefore going to have to deal with two central challenges. First, in its dealings with other policy fields development policy is going to be increasingly forced to deal with growing allocation conflicts for scarce resources and to defend itself in disputes concerning the areas for which it is concretely responsible. If it is to successfully accept this challenge, European development policy is, second, going to have to overcome the multiplicity of coherence problems with which it is beset. The fragmentation or disintegration of European DC is the most effective barrier to a coherent and strategic orientation of this policy field at the European level. It is not only that at the Commission level, at least three commissioners (development cooperation, trade, foreign relations) are responsible for development-related tasks. The situation is even more complex by the appearance of another influential actor, the High Representative for the CFSP. Furthermore, at present it also continues to be unclear whether and to what extent the role and the competences of a future EU foreign minister will serve to reduce the scope of these coherence problems, or indeed to render them all the more complicated. Apart from the institutional blockades at the EU level, there is also a need for coordination processes between the national ministries and implementing agencies involved in the technical and financial cooperation provided by member states, an effort which would boost the aim of a common European development policy. Last, the creation of a coherent European development policy is at times obstructed by the great number of autonomous and semi-autonomous actors engaged in the field of project planning and implementation. A heightened awareness of the chances and risks associated with a closer intertwinement of security policy and development policy for European development policy might prove to be a selective incentive to get on with the institutional reforms urgently required to boost coherence. On the basis of the arguments advanced above, however, European development policy will be unable to position itself successfully and proactively in the field of security unless it seeks organizational reform. Its contribution to European security policy cannot simply be added as a new bullet point in the to-do list of European DC. Such an approach would contribute to a further organizational and conceptual fragmentation of DC, the structure of the European DC needs an organizational reform with an eye to the emerging new field of activity. In Europe, foreign, security, and development policy are all in the midst of a profound process of transformation where interdependencies between these three policy fields are becoming more and more manifest. As far as development policy is concerned, considerable creative power will therefore be needed to reshape this policy field in such a way as to safeguard its autonomy and relevance, without losing sight of the interdependencies involved in Europe's external relations. This creative power will see itself confronted with manifest distribution conflicts between major international development projects that, while linked, still compete with one another.
Since the 1990s, and despite stagnating investments in international development cooperation, development policy has continued to enlarge its agenda. The HIPC initiatives, the PRSP process, the MDGs, the Rio agenda, and development policy's efforts to help shape the course of globalization characterize the growingly comprehensive challenges that development policy must meet. The linkage between development policy and security policy, which is a core element of the ESS, adds another resource-intensive and highly complex field of activity. An attempt to aggregate this thematic diversity leads to three megaprojects of international development policy:
• the MDG poverty-reduction agenda
• the security agenda
• the Rio agenda, with its focus on global challenges.
There is no doubt that each of these three megaprojects is of great significance for international politics, and there are major interrelationships between poverty reduction, security, and other trans-boundary global problems. But the actors concretely involved in these projects should be aware that in a world of scarce resources there are also tensions between projects of this scale. These tensions and conflict potentials are bound up with the allocation and deployment of monetary resources; the weighting assigned to the megaprojects; divergent partner countries views concerning these projects; and different roles played in these projects by other externally oriented ministries and government agencies outside development policy.
Poverty Reduction and the MDG agenda:
This is the classic playing field of development policy. UNDP's Human Development Report 2003 outlines the "roadmap" for an MDG-oriented development policy concentrated in essence on halving absolute poverty, eradicating poverty-linked diseases, and ensuring access to basic education for all by the year 2015. Viewed from this perspective, development policy should be targeted on the world's 60 poorest countries, which are unable to reach the Millennium Goals on their own. Among these countries are some 20 that are torn by war and violence. However, viewed from the perspective of the MDGs, development programs in Peru, Honduras, Kenya, and Bangladesh are just as important as development programs in Afghanistan or Iraq, even though the former countries pose no or only limited international security risks. Although the fact that poverty reduction also contributes to more security and stability in partner countries, may be seen as a positive externality, this is not a goal per se. Accordingly, poverty-reduction strategies consonant with the MDG logic cannot be concentrated one-sidedly on countries, which pose security threats to the industrialized countries. They must focus on the societies weakest in socioeconomic terms. If we follow the calculations presented by Jeffery Sachs' Millennium Development Project, the donor countries would have to roughly double their ODA investments by the year 2015 if the MDGs are in fact to be reached by 2015.
The security agenda and the management of crisis states: Conflict prevention, conflict management, and the political stabilization of weak countries are the development-related building blocks of the European security strategy. Here poverty reduction and the development of basic social infrastructures and securityrelated institutions (police, courts, demobilization of irregular military units) are instruments that can be used to contain disintegration processes in developing countries that (might) present international security risks. To take the ESS seriously as a script for European DC means to concentrate the limited funds available mainly on the 20-30 states and societies that have already failed or are threatened with failure. Funds would accordingly have to be allocated on the basis of a logic different from that of the MDG project. The primary target group would have to consist of societies that are currently regarded as acute security risks, not of the neediest countries in socioeconomic terms. The main concern would thus continue to prevent countries from sliding into the category of failing states. The question of whether developmentrelated investments would best be made in Peru and Tanzania or in Iraq and Afghanistan would in this case have to be answered from the "security perspective", and it would not be difficult to come up with cogent reasons for such a decision.
A broadly effective strategy designed to stabilize this group of security-relevant countries would have its price. "State-building", durable stabilization, "nation-building" are long-term processes that devour huge amounts of financial resources. The task of stabilizing a relatively small territory like Kosovo, which is by no means complete, has already cost the international community several billions of dollars; and major investments like those underway in Afghanistan are devouring even more resources ( over US $ 2.7 billion p.a. just for international reconstruction funds). The US attempt to "rebuild" Iraq into a stable partner for the West has, since early 2003, cost more than US$ 100 billion. In addition, the ESS requires new forms of networking between foreign policy and development policy, while the "MDG agenda" is mainly the responsibility of the traditional development policy actors.
The Rio agenda and the resolution of world problems:
The pressing world problems that dominated the 1992 Rio global environmental conference and the 1990s development debates over global public goods have been deprived of some of their "urgency" by the threats posed by transnational terrorism as well as by the focus of international development agencies on the goal of halving worldwide poverty by the year 2015 in connection with the MDGs. In the shadow of 9/11/01 it has become increasingly difficult to mobilize the funds needed to control climate change and to protect global environmental goods, global environmental systems, and biodiversity. Development policy has an important role to play in this field, for not one single world environmental problem can be solved without the cooperation of developing countries. While there are close connections between poverty and environmental degradation, the global environmental agenda calls for priorities and strategic conclusions that differ considerably from those implied by the MDG perspective. In the former case, the target group would primarily be the countries which are contributing to a buildup of global environmental problems and without whose involvement in transboundary environmental policies no environmental turnaround is to be expected. This group of countries is neither identical with the group of 60 developing countries which UNDP has identified as essential partners in the MDG agenda nor with the societies that are seen as important from the perspective of security policy dominant today. The majority of regional anchor countries have a central role to play in containing global environmental problems. 6 The costs of an effective strategy designed to come to grips with global environmental problems are high. The German government's "Advisory Council on Global Environmental Change" has calculated that the OECD countries would have to invest roughly 1 % of their GDP in global environmental policy to put an end to the growing degradation of the world ecosystem.
Thanks to their economic and political importance as regional powers and new global players in world politics, some of these anchor countries are of crucial significance when it comes to sustainably stabilizing the international financial markets, building a global security regime, establishing worldwide rules for dealing with controversial technologies and further developing the international system and the UN. Viewed in terms of the logic of the Rio agenda as well as of other global challenges, development policy would have to work closely together with other sector ministries (such as ministries for the environment, science, research, and finances) to develop effective programs for cooperation with the anchor countries.
Viewed against the background of the major projects outlined above, the question now is what strategic options will European development policy base its future action on.
The path of continuity:
The bilateral, European, and multilateral actors of development policy deny the existence of distribution conflicts and tensions between the three megaprojects discussed above, and continue to work -with limited funds available -in all three fields. This is a fairly realistic perspective, one that follows established routines and declines to make an issue of conflicts. However, strategies of this kind tend to disperse activities and resources and therefore to be less effective and target-oriented.
The strategy of concentration:
Here the actors of development policy concentrate on one or two megaprojects instead of seeking to tackle all problems at once. The high priority presently accorded by the OECD countries to the fight against terrorism may, if nothing is done to counter its effects, imply neglect of other fields of international politics. This path is also risky, for poverty reduction, security, sustainable development, and other world problems are closely intertwined and will continue to be relevant problem constellations throughout the coming decades. The international community would therefore be ill advised to neglect these challenges if it is to avoid any undesirable boomerang effects. 
Strategic division of labor:
Since the path of continuity and the strategy of concentration entail major risks, and since, at the same time, there is no real reason to assume that investments in international cooperation are likely to multiply soon, the question of strategic division of labor between bilateral, European, and multilateral development-policy actors becomes essential. While the range of activities provided by bilateral, European, and multilateral donors, is quite similar in many respects, the new challenges imply an urgent need for functionally specialized responses to the three megaprojects. Three questions must be answered in this connection: Which development actors have competitive advantages in what core areas? How can a division of labor help to develop advantages of specialization that would serve to lower costs and at the same time to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of development policy? How is it possible to reduce costly redundancies between the major actors of international development policy?
Strategic division of labor as the first-best solution -a conceptual sketch: Without being able to furnish a complete answer to the questions outlined above, we can note that strategic division of labor appears to be the most promising option. This option is positioned along the dividing line between the relative diversity and the relative randomness of current European development policy on the one hand and a possible concentration on security-relevant issues on the other. In view of both, the current reality and the particular features of the three megaprojects, the following division of labor could prove to be a reasonable approach to lowering transaction costs, enhancing the supply strengths of various donors, and improving the effectiveness of international DC:
• A future priority of European DC: The use of development-policy measures to contain international crisis flash points is an approach that would overburden the capacities of the individual member states. The EU's development policy should therefore gradually be brought into line with the Solana strategy. The experiences that have been made with concurrent activities of a large number of bi-and multilateral actors in Afghanistan or in the Balkans provide support for this thesis. The EU leadership role for the EU favored by the present paper would in no way rule out an integration and mobilization of member-state experiences in specific crisis regions (e.g. France in parts of Africa).
• Core tasks of the multilateral system of development cooperation: The major multilateral organizations -above all the World Bank, UNDP, and the regional development banks -should gear their activities to the MDG agenda and seek to expand their specialization advantages in this field. Bilateral organizations involved in technical and financial cooperation could assume the following functions in connection with the MDG agenda: a) involvement in tendering procedures for multilateral programs (strengthening of competition); b) complementary bilateral contributions to multilateral programs (more coherence); c) sectoral leadership of bilateral organizations in multilaterally coordinated programs, assuming that bilateral actors have relevant supply strengths (orientation to competitive advantages). In view of the weaknesses displayed by some multilateral organizations in operational development cooperation, it would be important that an orientation of this kind be accompanied by targeted structural reforms of the multilateral aid agencies. This would be a challenge to be dealt with by the stakeholders of the international organizations (i.e. governments).
• The orientation of bilateral DC: The bilateral cooperation provided by the EU member states should seek to strengthen MDG activities, above all by stepping up their financial transfers to multilateral organizations, by adopting active strategies to gain influence on the further development of these activities, and by providing complementary contributions to multilaterally coordinated programs -in particular in cases where it is possible for bilateral cooperation to combine its specific regional expertise with core sector competences. In view of a situation marked by a scarcity of funds, it would make little sense for individual donor countries to operate, on top of multilateral programs, an unfocused "bunch" of low-budget national activities in "MDG countries". Moreover, the core field of bilateral development policy might in the future come to be seen in cooperation with anchor countries, without whose involvement crucial world problems are bound to remain unsolved. While a European coordination and focusing of activities and cooperation with other international actors is essential here to effectively tackle global environmental problems and other world problems, bilateral cooperation with anchor countries would be in accord with the prominent role played by this country group in foreign and security policy as well as in economic and technological terms. None of the larger EU countries will be willing to forego bilateral cooperation with these centrally important countries.
